Separating myth from reality, this authoritative resource provides the reader with a current and comprehensive understanding of information warfare operations planning, including offensive, defensive, and influence operations. The book identifies the features of information operations (IO) that differ from traditional military operations and reveals why this discipline is more important now than ever before. Learn how to include and monitor the satisfaction of political constraints and guidelines throughout the planning process and how to display the cause-and-effect relationship among all objectives and supporting tasks, including the synergy between kinetic and non-kinetic actions.

This cutting-edge reference presents recently developed methods designed to provide enhanced reachback support from distributed locations, including Collaboration and Requests for Analysis. Learn why and how the military deception plan and OPSEC plan need to be developed and monitored together rather than separately. Discover new planning tools that have been brought together under a single platform to become the next IO Planning Tool for the U.S. Department of Defense. Additionally, the book defines The Idea Battlespace concept, identifies new threats and opportunities, and explains why the U.S. is not yet winning the war for the minds. This forward-looking volume explains why the Information Space to be considered its own Domain, with its own Interagency Service, in order to succeed in the Information Age.

The book offers both traditional and innovative ways of thinking about IO both now and in the future, while debunking many common myths and misperceptions. This unique resource presents the mutually supporting aspects of traditional military and IO planning, weaving a seamless approach for planning both kinetic and non-kinetic options across IO's offensive, defensive, and influence operations as an integral part of the overall plan.

Highlights of this authoritative book include discussions on:

• Why Military Deception and Operations Security planning must be undertaken as mutually supporting aspects of the same planning and execution monitoring process.
  
  
• Why the United States is currently losing the battle for the minds in the Idea Battlespace, and specific steps to succeed in that arena.
  
  
• Why the United States needs to define the Information Space as its own Domain, with an Interagency Service as the primary combatant.
  
  
• How to define and monitor satisfaction of political constraints throughout the planning process.
  
  
• How to include computer network operations in exercises, experiments, and testing while not shutting down the event.
  
  
• How to plan for, task, review, and document reachback support for distributed planning, and why the end product is a distributed plan.

Section 1: Information Operations Planning Context

1: Information Operations and Its Role in Security and Conflict

Purpose and Principles of IO

Examples of IO Implementations in Recent Conflicts

What IO is Not

The Role of IO in Effects Based Planning

2: The Increasing Importance of IO in Military Operations

Early Examples of Information Operations

Military Conflict in the Information Age

Advantage, Dependence, and Vulnerability in Information Age Societies

3: Characteristics of IO Planning

The Large IO Planning Space

The Time and Space Dimensions of IO

Direct and Indirect Effects in IO

The Role of Feedback in IO

The Complexity of IO

The Information Requirements of IO

IO Classification Issues

Section 2: The IO Planning Process and Tools

4: Categories of IO Planning

The Evolving U.S. Doctrine of IO

Three Useful Categories of IO

Types of IO Operations Planning

Organizing for IO Operations Planning

IO Acquisition Planning

5: Planning Methodologies and Technologies for Attack Missions in IO

Defining the Space of Options

Quantifying the Political Constraints

Cause and Effect Networks (CAENs)

Blue versus Red COA Comparisons

Employment Options and the Blue Capabilities Matrix

Scalability, Reachback, and Requests for Analysis

Multilevel Security and Distributed Plans

6: Planning Methodologies and Technologies for Influence Missions in IO

The Influence Operations Planning Context

Categorizing Message Purposes

The Idea Battlespace

Getting and Maintaining Attention

Change Methods and Submethods

Delivery Mechanisms

Measuring Influence Success

Entering Influence Ops in the CAEN

7: Planning Methodologies and Technologies for Defense Missions in IO

How Defense Differs from Attack or Influence

Military Deception Planning

Operations Security Planning

Computer Network Defense Planning

8: Monitoring and Replanning During Execution

Monitoring Plan Progress

Monitoring Branches and Sequels

Execution Monitoring for Attack

Execution Monitoring for Influence

Execution Monitoring for Defense

When to Replan—or Not Replan

Feedback Process to Refine Planning Factors

9: Planning Tools and Technologies

Semiautomating the Planning Process

Semiautomated Planning Tools

COA Planning Technologies

Effects Prediction Technologies

Adversarial and Nonadversarial Reasoning Technologies

10: Planning for IO Logistics, Training, and Acquisition

The Logistics of IO

IO Transformation and Acquisition Planning

IO in Training, Experimentation, and Testing

Legal Issues of IO

Section 3: The Future of IO Planning

11: The Future of Information Conflict

Feature 1: Everyone Has a Message

Feature 2: Every Idea Can Rapidly Be Known Globally

Feature 3: Everyone in the World Is the Potential Audience for Every Message We Create

Feature 4: Every Group Has Its Own Spin on Every Other Group’s Message

Feature 5: Most Messages Are About a Third Group, Rather Than a Direct Communication Between Two Groups

Feature 6: Initiative Matters in the Idea Battlespace

Feature 7: Accusations Are an Easy Way to Gain the Initiative

Feature 8: Conflicts in the Idea Battlespace Will Often Spill Over into the Physical World

Feature 9: Conflicts in the Idea Battlespace Cannot Be Won in the Physical Space

Feature 10: Allies Are Important in Competitions Within the Idea Battlespace

Feature 11: Neither Adversaries Nor Allies Are Necessarily Permanent in the Idea Battlespace

Feature 12: Some Groups Will Cheat in the Idea Battlespace and Thereby Gain an Advantage

Feature 13: Multiple Dimensions of Power Are Essential to the Long-Term Success in the Idea Battlespace

Feature 14: There Is No Rear Area or Sanctuary in the Idea Battlespace

Feature 15: Conflict in the Idea Battlespace Is Persistent, Not Episodic

12: Planning for Success in a New Age

Revolutions in Military and Political Thought

The Information Sphere as a Domain

Appendix: IO Attack Desired Effects Definitions